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本文基于2012年世界银行关于中国企业运营的制度环境质量调查数据,旨在从实证角度研究贿赂等腐败活动与企业垂直整合之间的内在关系。研究发现,贿赂等腐败活动会弱化企业垂直整合动机;此外,本研究结论显示随着国有控股比例的增加和制度质量的改善,贿赂等腐败活动对企业垂直整合的影响也会随之弱化。进一步地,本文还揭示了腐败影响企业垂直整合动机的两条渠道传导机制:即政府订单和银行贷款。上述结论意味着在转型经济体中,贿赂等腐败活动是专业化“小微”企业应对当前市场机制不完善的一种次优策略,但随着市场化制度的逐步完善、法治最高权威的逐步确立,专业化“小微”企业会逐渐放弃这种次优策略,进而选择由完善的市场机制所确立的生存法则。
Based on the 2012 World Bank survey on the institutional environment quality of Chinese business operations, this paper attempts to examine from an empirical point of view the intrinsic relationship between corrupt activities such as bribery and the vertical integration of enterprises. The study found that corrupt activities such as bribery would weaken the vertical integration motivation of enterprises. In addition, the conclusion of this study shows that with the increase of the proportion of state-controlled enterprises and the improvement of the quality of the system, the influence of corrupt activities such as bribery on the vertical integration of enterprises will also be weakened. Further, this article also reveals two channels of transmission mechanism that corruption affects the vertical integration motivation of enterprises: government orders and bank loans. The above conclusion means that in the transition economies, corrupt activities such as bribery are the specialization of “small and micro enterprises” to deal with the imperfect current market mechanism as a sub-optimal strategy. However, with the gradual improvement of the market-oriented system, the highest authority of the rule of law The gradual establishment of specialized “small and micro” enterprises will gradually give up this suboptimal strategy, and then choose to establish a perfect market mechanism established by the law of survival.