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对新近侯红霞等人发表在《山东大学学报》(理学版)的无证书聚合签名方案进行了分析,给出了两种攻击方法,在这种攻击方式下,KGC具有与签名人同样的能力,能做到对任意选择的消息生成有效签名.另外,对秦艳琳等人发表在《通信学报》上的无证书多重签名方案进行了分析,发现任何人都可以对该签名方案进行攻击.最后,分析指出了存在这些攻击的根本原因.所给出的这些攻击方法,对于无证书签名的构造和安全性分析具有借鉴意义.
This paper analyzes the certificateless aggregate signature scheme recently published by Hou Hongxia and others in Journal of Shandong University (Science Edition), and gives two attack methods. In this attack mode, KGC has the same ability as the signer, Can generate a valid signature for any message of choice.In addition, we analyze the unsubscribed multi-signature scheme of Qin Yanlin et al published in Journal of Communications and find that anyone can attack the signature scheme.Finally, The root causes of these attacks are pointed out, and the given attack methods are of reference for the construction and security analysis of certificateless signatures.