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We study when and how the host organization of a group of non-collusive sellers, such as a shopping mall, can profit from membership pricing strategies towards consumers, including membership fees, subsidies, and discounts.We find the general formula for designing the hosts equilibrium membership strategy, which depends on various price elasticities of demand for each seller and for the host, as well as on the profit-sharing arrangement between each seller and the host.A more elastic demand for individual sellers or a less elastic demand for the host generally favors a membership fee versus a subsidy.A strikingly simple sufficient condition for an equilibrium membership fee only requires that the sum of the shares of profit that the host takes from individual sellers do not exceed 1, which applies under very general circumstances.An equilibrium subsidy emerges when the previously mentioned sum of profit shares exceeds a positive threshold.We also find determinants of the profitability of purchase-contingent membership discounts.