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本文的研究整合了公共选择理论和演化博弈理论,通过智能设计扩展了捕食者-猎物模型,解释了在转型经济学中被广为接受的预设——“演化制度主义视角”。模型中,以增长为导向的中央政府领导人是制度变革的精明设计者,省级和地方官员是潜在的捕食者,私营企业是潜在的猎物。模型发现,歧视性政策的减少是中国的市场奇迹在制度上的主要贡献者,而法治和保护私有财产权方面的改进对短期经济增长来说并不是必要的。
The research in this paper integrates public choice theory and evolutionary game theory, expands the predator-prey model through intelligent design, and explains the widely accepted presumed transitional economics- “evolutionary institutionalism perspective.” In the model, growth-oriented leaders of central government are savvy designers of institutional change, provincial and local officials are potential predators, and private-sector businesses are potential prey. The model found that the reduction of discriminatory policies was the major institutional contributor to China’s market miracle, while the improvement of the rule of law and the protection of private property rights were not necessary for short-term economic growth.