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本文在学习和总结前人研究成果的基础上,建立了政府监管下的三群体2×2×2劳资关系演化博弈模型,给出了政府、劳方、资方的动态复制系统,分析了系统的演化过程,并探讨了不同参数条件下的演化稳定策略。最后,通过仿真分析发现,三群体最理想的稳定策略是劳资双方合作、政府部门不监管,此时,个体收益不是最优,但三群体总收益达到最大。
On the basis of studying and summarizing the achievements of previous researches, this paper established a 2 × 2 × 2 evolutionary game model of industrial relations under the supervision of the government. The dynamic replication system of government, labor and employers was given, and the evolution of the system was analyzed Process, and discusses the evolutionary stability strategy under different parameters. Finally, through the simulation analysis, it is found that the most stable strategy of the three groups is the cooperation between employers and employees, and the government departments do not supervise. At this time, the individual income is not the best, but the total income of the three groups reaches the maximum.