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1986年11月18—20日,苏联科学院哲学研究所就如何理解列宁关于物质范畴的定义问题展开了一场论争(参见《哲学科学》1987年第5期)。争论表明,对列宁的定义可以区分出两种极端的解释:一种认为物质是实物客体;另一种认为物质是在人的实践背景上才能得到解释的社会范畴。此后本刊信箱的调查表明,这两种极端的观点在学术界均有自己的坚定拥护者,而且人们就此发表了一些饶有趣味的见解。本刊登载的弗兰楚佐娃、彼得洛夫的父亲(1988年第7期)和尤尔钦科的文章就是这种多元论的结果。这引起人们对如何理解列宁的物质定义问题产生更大的兴趣。现在已十分清楚了:人们一直坚持甚至更加强烈地要求从学术上,也可以说从社会方面重新研究这一问题。因此我们认为,对于研究这个问题的人们来说,以往的年代并未白白流逝。现在我们就选用几个人的发言。我们认为,他们仅想把已在苏联科学院哲学所争论中的发言者和在本刊著文者的观点向前推进一步。
On November 18-20, 1986, the Institute of Philosophy at the Soviet Academy of Sciences held a debate on how to understand Lenin’s definition of the category of matter (see Philosophy of Science, Issue 5, 1987). The argument shows that the definition of Lenin distinguishes two extreme explanations: one that holds that matter is a physical object; and another, a social category where material can be explained only in the context of human practice. Since then, our survey of mailboxes shows that these two kinds of extremist views have their own strong advocates in the academic world, and people have made some interesting insights. Franz Chuzoa, Petrov’s father (No. 7, 1988) and Yurchenko’s article are the result of this pluralism. This has given rise to a greater interest in how to understand Lenin’s material definition. It is now clear that one has always insisted and even more strongly demanded that the issue should be rediscovered academically and socially. Therefore, in our opinion, the past years have not gone unnoticed for those who study this issue. Now we choose a few people’s speech. We think they only want to take one step further from the perspective of the speakers in the philosophy of the Academy of Sciences and the authors of this magazine.