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在中国30年的改革过程中,国有企业改革是重点领域,其主要特点是通过股份制进行公司治理结构的改革。一些企业在进行现代企业制度改造之外,还进行了所有制改革。在这个过程中,一些企业领导层利用自己的管理权,掠夺企业资产,将企业据为己有,从而实现家族控股。中国的上市公司出现了“一股独大”的局面:在上市的国有公司中,国有股占主要地位;私人上市公司往往被家族控股。因此,上市公司股票流动性不足,公众持股分散,大股东缺乏制约,小股东的利益得不到保护。因此,产权改革不能仅仅追求单一的效率,一味地强调将国有产权向企业家精英私人转化,而必须考虑社会公众的承受力和公众的判断标准。在公平中追求产权变革的效率,在稳定中寻求社会经济的发展。
During the 30 years of reform in China, the reform of state-owned enterprises is a key area. Its main feature is the reform of the corporate governance structure through the shareholding system. Some enterprises carry out the reform of ownership system in addition to carrying out the reform of the modern enterprise system. In the process, some business leaders use their power of management to plunder corporate assets, take the business as their own, and achieve family control. China’s listed companies have seen a “single dominant position.” Of the listed state-owned companies, state-owned shares dominate; private listed companies are often dominated by families. Therefore, the listed companies have insufficient stock liquidity, the public shares are dispersed, the major shareholders lack the restriction and the minority shareholders’ interests can not be protected. Therefore, the reform of property rights can not only pursue the single efficiency, but also emphasize the private transformation of the state-owned property right to the entrepreneurial elite. However, we must consider the social public’s tolerance and public judgment. In the fair pursuit of the efficiency of property rights change, in the stability of social and economic development.