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联保贷款通过利用团体成员之间的信息优势和连带偿还责任机制,自发形成内部横向监督,以解决中小企业与银行之间的信息不对称所引起的道德风险问题.首先通过构建相应的横向监督分析模型,发现连带责任、再融资需求以及社会制裁会是影响横向监督的主要因素;然后讨论了不同监督模式下联保团体成员的横向监督问题,以及实现最优监督水平的条件,研究发现在联保团体成员同质情形下要提高有效监督水平可以采用相互监督模式,而联保团体成员异质情形下再融资需求越高的成员所付出的监督水平越大,选择这类成员担任联保组长时,可以有效提升监督水平,被监督企业发生策略性违约也将概率下降,银行与联保体的整体收益也将随之上升;最后探讨了促使这类成员为组长的激励机制.
The UNPROFOR loan spontaneously forms the internal horizontal supervision by using the information superiority and the joint liability mechanism of the group members to solve the problem of moral hazard caused by the information asymmetry between SMEs and banks.Firstly, through constructing the corresponding horizontal supervision Analysis of the model and found that joint and several liability, refinancing needs and social sanctions will be the main factors that affect the horizontal supervision. Then we discuss the horizontal supervision of the members of the UNPROFOR group under different supervision modes and the conditions for achieving the optimal supervision level. Members of UNPROFOR group under the same circumstances to improve the level of effective supervision can be used to monitor each other, while the members of UNPROFOR heterogeneous circumstances, the higher the need for refinancing the supervision of the members of the greater the choice of such members as UNPROFOR Leader, can effectively enhance the level of supervision, the supervision of strategic oversight enterprises will also reduce the probability of probability, the overall return on bank and the UNPROFOR body will also rise; finally discussed to encourage such members as the leader of the incentive mechanism.