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国企改革是一个涉及面很广的系统工程。对于改革国企经营者的激励机制，不少学者、企业界人士进行了积极的探索，提出了多种建议和策略。目前国企经营者激励机制改革的基本思路是：以产权明晰实现政企分开、把经营者推向市场；同时设立国有资产所有权管理机构，向企业派驻法人代表，以解决“所有者缺位”问题，有效地监督经营者提高国有资本的运营效果，防止国有资产流失；实行年薪制、股票期权等多种形式的长短期激励方式相结合，平衡经营者和企业所有者之间的利益问题，防止经营者的短期行为。这种改革思路似乎已经解决了产权明晰、产权委托代理和产权监督激励等一系列的产权问题，但在实践中国企经营者的激励机制改革至今尚未取得预期的成效。为了反思对国企激励机制认识上的一些偏差，需要我们在已有的基础上对有关环节进行理性思考和实践修正。
The reform of state-owned enterprises is a systematic project involving a wide range of issues. For the incentive mechanism for reforming SOE managers, many scholars and business people have made active explorations and put forward various suggestions and tactics. At present, the basic idea of the reform of incentive mechanism for state-owned enterprise operators is to separate government from enterprise with clear property rights and to bring operators to the market. At the same time, the state-owned assets ownership management institution should be set up and corporate representatives should be stationed to solve the problem of “owner absence” , Effectively supervising managers to improve the operational effect of state-owned capital and prevent the loss of state-owned assets; the implementation of various forms of long-term and short-term incentive measures such as annual salary system and stock options to balance the interests between the operator and the enterprise owner and prevent Short-term behavior of managers. This reform ideas seem to have solved a series of property rights and property rights, property rights and property rights oversight agency incentives, but in practice the effectiveness of reform incentives Chinese enterprises operators has yet to achieve the desired. In order to reflect on some of the deviations in the understanding of SOE incentive mechanism, we need to make rational consideration and practice revision of the relevant links on the basis of the existing ones.