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基于经典的税收竞争理论,本文分析了在名义税率全国统一的背景下,我国地方间税收竞争的两种隐性形式。当政绩考核目标以促进经济发展为主时,隐性税收竞争表现为地方对于税收的不当宽减。当政绩考核目标以完成税收任务为主时,隐性税收竞争表现为地方对于税收的过度课征。为此,本文以税收透明度为视角揭示了其对于整治隐性税收竞争、推进税收法治进程的政策意涵。
Based on the classic theory of tax competition, this paper analyzes two kinds of recessive forms of tax competition in our country under the condition of national unification of nominal tax rate. When the goal of performance evaluation is to promote economic development, the implicit tax competition is manifested as an improper tax concession by local governments. When the goal of performance evaluation to complete the task of tax-based, implicit tax competition is manifested as an over-levied tax levy. For this reason, this article reveals its policy implications for the process of revising the implicit tax competition and promoting the process of rule of law in taxation from the perspective of tax transparency.