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保险公司偿付能力充足性是保险监管的内容之一,但是这一信息却往往不被投保人所获知,造成保险供给(保险公司)和保险需求(投保人)两方信息的不对称。本文以保险公司存在偿付能力风险为基本假定,以累积性预期理论和风险调整资本收益率构建保险需求和供给模型,分析在信息对称条件下和信息不对称条件下保险需求的变化及其对保险供给和保险公司盈利能力的影响。通过分析得出,当偿付能力信息不对称时保险市场会出现市场失灵,导致投保人利益受损和保险公司缺少降低偿付能力风险的动机。因此,加强保险偿付能力监管,并且降低保险公司与投保人之间的信息不对称性是提高保险市场效率的有效途径。
Insurance companies solvency adequacy is one of the contents of the insurance regulation, but this information is often not informed by the insured, resulting in the supply of insurance (insurance companies) and insurance needs (policyholders) both asymmetric information. Based on the assumption of solvency risk of insurance companies, this paper constructs insurance demand and supply model based on cumulative expectation theory and risk-adjusted return on capital, analyzes the change of insurance demand under information symmetry and information asymmetry, Supply and insurer profitability. The analysis shows that the market failure will occur in the insurance market when the solvency information is asymmetric, leading to the insufficiency of policyholders’ interests and the insurer’s lack of motivation to reduce the solvency risk. Therefore, to strengthen the regulation of the insurance solvency and to reduce the information asymmetry between insurance companies and policyholders is an effective way to improve the efficiency of the insurance market.