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通过构建一个理性政府与市场投资者就该国保留或放弃欧洲货币联盟成员国资格问题进行博弈的理论模型,本文分析了欧元区边缘国家(即“欧猪五国”)主权债务利差变化深层机制。对希腊而言,2009年12月后,市场预期经历了该国政府保留成员国资格承诺从可信到不可信,该国政府债务从存在隐性担保到不存在的双重转变,因此导致该国利差骤升;对其它四国而言,利差的上升主要反映出市场对其政府保留成员国资格承诺不确定性的预期。
By constructing a theoretical model of a game between rational government and market investors on whether the EU retains or gives up the membership of the EMU, this paper analyzes the sovereign debt spread of the euro-zone periphery countries (ie, “PIGS”). Change the deep mechanism. For Greece, after December 2009, the market is expected to go through a double shift in the government’s commitment to retain member states’ qualifications from credible to untrustworthy and from the existence of implicit guarantees to the absence of government debt in that country, thus causing the country Spreads have soared; for the other four countries, the rise in interest rates mainly reflects the expectation that the government will remain uncertain about the qualifications of its member states.