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为研究事故瞒报问题的深层原因,采用演化博弈和系统动力学(SD)方法,在复制动态方程的基础上,构建安监部门和施工单位间的博弈系统流图模型,分析采用纯策略、随机策略、混合策略及动态惩罚措施情况下事故瞒报问题的演化博弈过程及影响因子;利用Vensim_Ple仿真软件,对系统进行模拟仿真分析。结果表明,施工单位不瞒报的概率会随安监部门调查强度的增加而趋于稳定;安监部门对施工单位的调查概率、惩罚力度是影响事故瞒报问题是否发生的重要因素。
In order to study the underlying causes of accident concealment problem, the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) method are used to build a game system flow graph model between safety supervision department and construction unit based on the replication of dynamic equations. Pure flow strategy, Stochastic strategy, hybrid strategy and dynamic punishment measures in case of accident concealment problem evolution process and impact factor; the use of Vensim_Ple simulation software, the system simulation analysis. The results show that the probability of concealment by construction units tends to be stable with the increase of survey intensity of safety supervision department. The investigation probability and punishment of construction units by safety supervision department are important factors that affect the concealment of accidents.