论文部分内容阅读
矿业投资过程中矿山企业股权转让存在竞争,如何使投资者在股权转让中获得较高的收益是一个值得研究的问题。以矿业公司在转让股权时实现利益最大化为研究目标,分析矿业股权转让相关利益方的博弈,建立基于不完全信息的矿业股权转让动态博弈模型,分析模型均衡状态下博弈双方的策略组合,并给出各策略组合下博弈双方期望收益的计算公式。最后,以江西省某矿业开发有限公司(合资公司)投资钼矿项目为例进行应用,对该项目中利益相关方之间的博弈进行分析,并结合具体数据,得到了各利益相关方之间的博弈均衡解。为投资公司提供的决策结论为:应以不高于3 000万元的转让价款收购某地调队持有的45%的股份,期望收益较高。
In the course of mining investment, there is competition in the equity transfer of mining enterprises. How to make investors get higher returns in equity transfer is a problem worth studying. In order to maximize the benefits of the mining company when it transfers the equity, this paper analyzes the game of stakeholders involved in the mining equity transfer, establishes the dynamic game model of the mining equity transfer based on the incomplete information, and analyzes the strategy combination of the two sides under the equilibrium of the model. The formulas for calculating the expected return of the two sides under each strategy are given. Finally, the paper takes the investment of molybdenum project of a mining company in Jiangxi province as an example, analyzes the game between the stakeholders in this project, and combines the specific data to get the conclusion among the various stakeholders Game equilibrium solution. The decision made for the investment company concludes that it should acquire 45% of the shares held by Tiaitun at a transfer price of not more than 30 million yuan and expect a higher return.