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自９０年代后期以来的中国国有企业改革中，如何激励和控制经营者即所谓的公司治理问题显得越来越重要。根据发达的市场经济国家的经验，在资本市场实现高度发展之前，外部股东对企业经营者的监督是非常有限的，甚至往往是得不偿失的。目前中国国有企业公司治理制度的改革，主要有“控股公司”和“授权经营”两种方式。作者认为，控股公司只能是一种过渡形式，今后宜改造成金融性的投资公司或实业性的企业集团，并对其投资范围进行大的调整。授权经营虽然在理论和实践上都有一定的问题，但似乎都符合中国的实际。至于对广大中小企业实行“放”的政策，不仅不应动摇，而且应以出售为主。即使改组为股份合作制，亦要适当提高经营者持股的比例
In the reform of state-owned enterprises in China since the late 1990s, how to motivate and control the so-called corporate governance issues of managers has become more and more important. According to the experience of the developed market economy countries, before the capital market attains a high degree of development, the external shareholders' supervision over the business operators is very limited and often outweighs the gains. At present, the reform of the corporate governance system of state-owned enterprises in China mainly consists of “holding company” and “authorized operation”. The author believes that the holding company can only be a transitional form, and should be transformed into a financial investment company or an industrial conglomerate in the future, with a big adjustment to the investment scope. Although authorized operations have some problems both in theory and in practice, they all seem to be in line with China's reality. As for the policy of “letting go” to the majority of SMEs, we should not only waver, but also sell mainly. Even if it is reorganized into a joint-stock cooperative system, the proportion of shares held by the operators should be appropriately raised