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资产专用性投资会对交易双方形成一种锁定效应,产生一种潜在的可占用性准租金。由于契约的不完全性,当投资一方在事后对另一方的收益进行了掠夺,准租金挤占由潜在成为事实,敲竹杠的事后机会主义行为发生。对于敲竹杠的治理,理论界持续关注,但一直未达成共识。克莱茵等坚持纵向一体化的解决方式,而以科斯为代表的学者们则认为长期合约更为有效。近期文献中,学者们开始致力于对经济组织中具体敲竹杠治理方式的研究。涌现出声誉机制、改变持股份额、担保方案、相互持股、参照点合约等多种理论。本文对专用性投资引起的敲竹杠及其治理问题进行了梳理和评述。探讨了上述各治理方案的适用性和限制条件,并对未来研究方向提出建议。
Asset-specific investment creates a locking effect on both parties to the transaction, creating a potential occupancy allowance. Owing to the incompleteness of the contract, when the investment side plundered the gains of the other party after the fact, the quasi-rent squeeze took place through opportunistic acts that later became potential facts. The theoretical circles continue to pay attention to the management of the hurdle, but no consensus has been reached yet. Klein and others insisted on vertical integration solutions, while Coase represented scholars think long-term contracts more effective. In the recent literature, scholars began to devote themselves to the study of specific methods of governance in economic organizations. Emergence of reputation mechanism, change the shareholding, guarantee program, mutual holdings, reference point contracts and other theories. This article reviews and comments on the problems caused by special investment and its governance. Discusses the applicability and restriction conditions of each of the above governance programs and makes suggestions for future research directions.