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本文从企业信息坏境的角度,通过对分析师跟踪、信息披露质量与控股股东利益侵占三者之间交互影响的分析,深入探讨分析师跟踪与信息环境之间的关系。研究结果表明:分析师跟踪人数的增加与信息披露质量的提高均可以有效地降低企业信息不对称程度,进而很好地抑制企业控股股东利益侵占行为。分析师跟踪的治理作用在信息披露质量较低的公司更加显著。
This paper analyzes the interaction between analyst tracking, information disclosure quality and controlling shareholder’s profit encroachment from the perspective of corporate information bad environment, and probes into the relationship between analyst tracking and information environment. The results show that both the increase of follow-up analysts and the improvement of the quality of information disclosure can effectively reduce the degree of asymmetric information in the enterprise, and then restrain the controlling shareholders’ interests from encroaching. The governance tracked by analysts is even more pronounced for companies with lower quality disclosures.