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研究了电力联营体 (Power Pool)中发电公司的报价策略。在非完全竞争的 Power Pool中 ,发电公司可以作为一个价格接受者 ,也可利用其市场势力操纵市场价格。发电公司作为价格接受者时将基于边际成本曲线报价 ,但其最低报价必须根据市场行情而变化 ;具有市场势力的发电公司可以采取限制产量、抬高电价的策略。 Power Pool中市场势力的存在不利于资源的优化配置和利用。
Researched the bidding strategies of power generation companies in the Power Pool. In a non-competitive Power Pool, a power generation company can act as a price receiver and can use its market power to manipulate market prices. When generating companies as price receivers, they will quote prices based on the marginal cost curve, but their minimum prices must change according to market conditions; power companies with market power can adopt strategies to limit production and raise electricity prices. The existence of market forces in Power Pool is not conducive to the optimal allocation and utilization of resources.