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阿伦特的法律思想虽不系统,却贯穿在她一生对极权统治的性质、对法律的来源和宪法创立,以及由艾希曼审判所引发的法理学思考当中。本文首先简述了她对法律概念的历史—哲学考察:在批评传统法律概念的绝对性预设的同时,她指出希腊的Nomos和罗马的lex都不把法律诉诸一个政治之外的超验来源,而是把法律理解为政治空间的“界线”或政治中的“关系”。接着简述了她对于宪法的解释学权威、国际法、个人罪责等问题的看法。本文说明研究阿伦特法律思想的意义,并不仅是为日益庞大的“阿伦特学”做出法学领域内的补充,更在于透过她的视角,重新把法律带回到政治思考当中。
Although not systematical, Arendt’s legal thought runs through the whole life of her to the nature of totalitarian rule, the origin of law and the establishment of the constitution, and jurisprudence triggered by Eichmann’s trial. This article first outlines her historical-philosophical investigation of the notion of law: while criticizing the absolute presupposition of the concept of traditional law, she points out that neither Greece’s Nomos nor Rome’s lex resorted to a law beyond a political transcendental Instead, it interprets law as the “boundary” of political space or the “relationship” of politics. Then she gives a brief account of her views on constitutional hermeneutics, international law and personal guilt. This article shows that the significance of studying Arendt’s legal thought is not merely to supplement the increasingly huge legal system of Arendt, but also to bring the law back to political thinking through her perspective among.