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虚拟水调度是调节区域水资源禀赋、保障水资源安全、提高水资源利用效率、创新水资源管理体制的重要手段之一,但如何调整政府与虚拟水企业之间的互动关系、进而调控虚拟水调度还有待研究。该研究围绕政府对虚拟水调度的补贴政策,构建了“政府-企业”的信号传递博弈模型,探索双方的信息判断与决策规律。结果表明:由于信息存在不对称性和不完全性以及影响因素的差异,博弈可能出现市场完全成功、部分成功、完全失败三种均衡,且市场均衡效率与企业的伪装成本和风险成本相关,由此提出相应的提高虚拟水调度效率的对策是提高检查效率、设置有效的惩罚力度、合理调整对虚拟水产业的补贴、实行扶持手段的多元化。
Virtual water dispatching is one of the most important means to regulate regional water resource endowment, ensure water resource security, improve water resource utilization efficiency and innovate water resources management system. However, how to adjust the interactive relationship between government and virtual water enterprises and then regulate virtual water Scheduling still to be studied. The research centers on the government subsidy policy for the dispatch of virtual water and constructs the signal transmission game model of “government-enterprise” to explore the information judgment and decision-making rules of both parties. The results show that due to the asymmetry and incompleteness of information and the difference of influencing factors, the game may have three equilibriums: the market is completely successful, the partially successful and the completely unsuccessful. And the equilibrium efficiency of the market is related to the cost and risk cost of the enterprise by The corresponding countermeasures to improve the efficiency of virtual water dispatch are to improve the efficiency of inspection, set effective penalties, rationally adjust the subsidies for virtual aquaculture, and implement the diversification of supporting measures.