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随着我国林权制度的改革,林权分配问题引起了社会关注,尤其是林权利益相关群体的关注。林业发展所产生的利益分配不公引起的林权纠纷也日益突出。文章认为,引起林权纠纷的根本原因在于初始林权分配不均导致的利益分配不公,通过建立“多林权群体”与“少林权群体”这两个参与林权纠纷的群体的演化博弈模型,分析了各个博弈群体的演化稳定策略及其稳定性。研究结果表明,通过演化稳定策略调整各林权利益群体的林权配置,并使其均等化,可以有效解决林权纠纷,并达到林权配置的社会最优化程度。
With the reform of the forest tenure system in our country, the distribution of forest tenure has aroused social concern, especially the interest groups of forest tenure. Forest disputes arising from the unfair distribution of benefits arising from the development of forestry have also become increasingly prominent. The paper argues that the root cause of the disputes over forest tenure lies in the unfair distribution of benefits caused by the unequal distribution of initial tenure of forest tenure. Through the establishment of two groups of disputes over forest tenure such as “Duolin rights group” and “Shaolin rights group” Evolutionary game model, and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy and stability of each game group. The results show that adjusting forest ownership rights of all forest rights groups through evolutionary stabilization strategy and making them equal to each other can effectively resolve the forest rights disputes and achieve the social optimum of forest rights allocation.