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针对由一个生产商和一个提供服务的零售商组成的供应链,分别在生产商Stackelberg(MS)、纵向纳什(VN)、零售商Stackelberg(RS)三种渠道权力结构下,研究了零售商的公平偏好对博弈均衡的影响机制。研究发现:首先,服务水平在RS结构下总是最低。提高服务效率总是有利于生产商利润、系统整体利润或效用,在MS、RS结构下,同样有利于零售商利润或效用。但在VN结构下,若服务效率已经处于较高水平,继续提升反而会损害零售商的利润或效用。其次,当零售商公平偏好时,对其来说渠道权力并不总是越多越好。若其对公平比例要求过高,则作为跟随者才能够获得最高的效用。最后,零售商公平偏好总是有损生产商的利润,且仅在MS下确定有利于自身效用。而在VN和RS下,若零售商对公平比例要求过高,则只会降低自己的效用。研究建议零售商不应同时追求更多的“公平”和更高的“权力”。文章末尾通过数值分析对模型结论进行了验证和说明。
Aiming at a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer providing services, the retailer’s research was conducted under the three channel power structures of the manufacturers Stackelberg (MS), vertical Nash (VN), and retailer Stackelberg (RS). The Influence Mechanism of Fair Preference on Game Equilibrium. The study found that: First, the service level is always the lowest under the RS structure. Increasing service efficiency is always beneficial to the profits of the manufacturer, the overall profitability of the system, or its utility. Under the MS and RS structure, it is also beneficial to retailers’ profit or utility. However, under the VN structure, if the service efficiency is already at a relatively high level, continued promotion will harm retailers’ profits or utility. Second, when the retailer prefers to be fair, channel power is not always better for him. If the demand for fairness is too high, then as a follower it will be able to obtain the highest utility. Finally, the retailer’s fairness preference always hurts the profit of the manufacturer, and it is only determined by MS that it is beneficial to its own utility. Under VN and RS, if the retailer’s demand for fairness is too high, it will only reduce their effectiveness. Research suggests that retailers should not pursue more “fairness” and higher “power” at the same time. At the end of the article, the conclusion of the model was verified and explained by numerical analysis.