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一、研究背景与问题提出公司治理问题是近几年经济学家、管理学家以及管理实践者关注的热点问题,而其中备受关注的是企业高管持股问题。从委托代理观点的企业理论来看,高管持股是股东、其他利益相关者和经营者的委托代理关系中的激励方案问题,处于委托代理理论的核心位置。我国企业以国有企业占据主导地位,在国有企业中,高管人员的的激励具有浓厚的“官本位”色彩。国有企业高管人员的任命大多数由上级主管部门直接任命,对企业高层管理人员经营成果的奖励主要体现在精神荣誉、行政级别等非物质性因素上,高管人员的货币收入长期偏低。这导致相当多的国企高管人员的行为发生异化,他们会凭借手中权力获得不正当收入来满足自己物质需要,产生了“59岁现象”、“冯根生难题”。这些现象从激励制度上看,暴露了国有企业在制度上、体制上
First, the research background and problems Corporate governance issues in recent years, economists, management scientists and management practitioners focus on the hot issues, which is the concern of executives is the issue of corporate executives. From the point of view of the agency theory, the executives shareholding is the incentive scheme in the principal-agent relationship between shareholders, other stakeholders and managers, and is at the core of the principal-agent theory. The state-owned enterprises in our country occupy the leading position. In the state-owned enterprises, the encouragement of senior executives has a strong “official standard” color. The appointment of senior executives in state-owned enterprises is mostly directly appointed by the higher-level department in charge. The rewards for the performance of top-level management of enterprises are mainly reflected in non-material factors such as spiritual honor and administrative level, and the long-term monetary income of senior executives is low. This leads to the alienation of a considerable number of executives in state-owned enterprises. They will earn their “59-year-old phenomenon” and “von Wenggen’s dilemma” by virtue of their power in obtaining illegitimate income. These phenomena from the incentive system point of view, exposing the state-owned enterprises in the system, the system