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在艾耶尔对哲学的许多富有影响的贡献中,包括了在其哲学发展不同阶段上所作的关于形而上学本质的论述。其早期观点是维也纳学派(更一般地说,是逻辑实证主义)反形而上学观点的明显翻版,而其后期观点,正如他通常强调的那样,在某些决定性方面则受惠于皮尔斯的实用主义和雷姆塞对理论的结构的分析。本文有两个主要目的。一是重新考察艾耶尔后期的形而上学观;二是通过揭示常识、科学和形而上学之间的关系来维护我自己关于形而上学本质的论述,并证明其有用性。
Among Ayer’s many influential contributions to philosophy include his discourse on the nature of metaphysics at various stages of his philosophical development. Its earlier view was a clear reversal of the anti-metaphysical views of the Vienna School (more generally, logical positivism), and its later views, as he usually emphasized, benefited from Pierce’s pragmatism and, in some decisive ways, Remus on the theoretical structure of the analysis. This article has two main purposes. One is to reexamine the later metaphysical view of Ayer; the other is to maintain my own argument about the essence of metaphysics by revealing the relationship between common sense, science and metaphysics, and prove its usefulness.