论文部分内容阅读
本文以558家地方政府控制的上市公司为样本,研究国企改革过程中,政治成本和代理成本对公司价值有何影响,以及能否减轻这种影响。我们发现,较高的政府终极控制权对公司价值产生负面影响,这不仅为Frye和Shleifer(1997)的“掠夺之手理论”提供了证据,而且初步打开了“国有股影响企业绩效”(Shlefer,1998)的“黑匣子”。我们还发现,通过监督公司高层甚至解聘经营不善的董事长或CEO能够缓解代理成本的消极影响。更重要的是,治理环境的改善能够同时降低政治成本和代理成本,有利于国企改革的顺利进行。
In this paper, 558 listed companies controlled by the local government as a sample to study the impact of political costs and agency costs on the value of the company in the process of state-owned enterprise reform, and whether this effect can be alleviated. We find that higher ultimate government control has a negative impact on corporate value, which not only provides evidence for Frye and Shleifer’s (1997) theory of plunder, but also initially opens the view that the influence of state-owned shares on firm performance, “(Shlefer, 1998) ” Black Box ". We also found that the negative impact of agency costs can be mitigated by overseeing the top management and even dismissing poorly managed chairman or CEO. More importantly, improving the governance environment can reduce both political costs and agency costs, which is conducive to the smooth progress of SOE reform.