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详细介绍了最后通牒博弈的实验范式及其各种变式:独裁者博弈、免惩罚博弈、保证博弈和德尔塔博弈。以往大量研究结果表明,理性经济人的假设、不公平厌恶理论以及强互惠理论并不能很好地预测人们在经济决策中的行为;研究结果比较符合社会效用理论的预测:人们在进行经济决策时并非只考虑自己的获益情况,还要与他人进行社会比较。尽管还没有十分直接的证据,许多研究者已指出,拒绝不公平分配方案是为了自我肯定,是在社会比较的基础上,维护个体自尊、身份、地位、名誉、声望、自我价值等的需要。研究加深我们对决策行为背后动机的理解,短期内拒绝不公平分配方案看似有损于个体的利益,但从长远角度,拒绝不公平分配方案不仅维护了个体的自尊、自我价值等,还使得个体在日后与他人的交往中能够赢得一定的地位,不至于陷于“任人宰割”的境地。从现实意义上讲,在政策法规制定和实施时要考虑到个体自我肯定的需要。
The experimental paradigm of the ultimatum game and its variants are introduced in detail: dictator game, punishment-free game, guaranteed game and delta game. In the past, a large number of research results show that rational economic man’s hypothesis, unfair aversion theory and strong reciprocity theory can not predict people’s behavior in economic decision-making well. The research results are more in line with the social utility theory prediction: when people make economic decisions Not only consider their own benefits, but also social comparison with others. Although there is no very direct evidence, many researchers have pointed out that rejecting the unfair distribution plan is for self-affirmation and for safeguarding the individual’s self-esteem, status, status, reputation, prestige and self-worth on the basis of social comparison. Research deepens our understanding of the motivation behind decision-making. In the short term, refusing an unfair distribution plan may seem detrimental to individual interests. However, in the long run, rejecting the unfair distribution plan not only maintains the individual’s self-esteem and self-worth, but also makes Individuals can win a certain position in their future contacts with others without being trapped in the position of “slaughtering people”. From a practical point of view, in the formulation and implementation of policies and regulations to take into account the individual needs of self-affirmation.