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以2009-2014年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,基于过度投资与在职消费视角探讨了非执行董事在股东-管理层代理冲突上的治理效应。研究发现,非执行董事有助于抑制公司过度投资及管理层在职消费,非执行董事在治理股东-管理层代理冲突中发挥了良好作用。进一步的研究发现,管理层权力对非执行董事的治理效应具有负面影响。此外,基于不同产权性质的研究表明,相较于国有企业,非执行董事在非国有企业中的治理效果更为显著。
Taking 2009-2014 A-share listed companies in China as the research object, this paper discusses the governance effect of non-executive directors on shareholder-management agency conflict based on overinvestment and in-service consumption. The study found that non-executive directors help curb over-investment in the company and on-the-job consumption of the management, and non-executive directors played a good role in managing shareholder-management proxy conflicts. Further research found that management power has a negative impact on the governance effect of non-executive directors. In addition, studies based on the nature of different property rights show that non-executive directors are more effective in controlling non-state-owned enterprises than state-owned enterprises.