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文章利用中国综合社会调查数据考察官员家庭对子女创业的影响,并进一步分析其内在作用机制。研究发现:第一,官员家庭显著抑制了子女的创业行为,降低了创业发生概率。第二,教育筛选机制能够解释官员家庭抑制创业现象,即官员家庭子女由于普遍拥有更长的教育年限而往往更不愿意选择风险较大的创业型工作。第三,官员家庭对创业的抑制主要来源于父亲为官,母亲为官对子女的创业影响不显著。此外,文章进一步甄别了可能与教育筛选并存的两种抑制创业的机制。出于“在位避嫌”的考虑,官员家庭会抑制子女创业,但是教育筛选仍然是其最主要的现实机制。相关的稳健性分类检验都支持了上述结论,并在此基础上得出了鼓励创业和保障就业公平的政策思路。
The article uses the data from China’s comprehensive social survey to examine the impact of official family on children’s entrepreneurship and further analyzes its intrinsic mechanism. The findings are as follows: First, the family of officials significantly inhibits the entrepreneurial behavior of their children and reduces the probability of entrepreneurship. Second, the education screening mechanism can explain the inhibition of entrepreneurship by officials ’families, that is, officials’ family children tend to be less willing to choose risky entrepreneurial jobs because they generally have longer education years. Thirdly, the family’s inhibition of entrepreneurship mainly comes from the father’s official, mother’s official pair children’s entrepreneurship is not significant. In addition, the article further identifies two types of entrepreneurship-inhibiting mechanisms that may co-exist with education screening. For the sake of “recuperating from being in position”, officials’ families will inhibit their children’s entrepreneurship, but education screening remains the most important realistic mechanism. Relevant robust classification tests support the above conclusion, and on this basis come to the policy ideas of encouraging entrepreneurship and ensuring employment fairness.