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本文通过对无限制、完全隐性保险和部分存款保险三种情况下银行最优风险选择的模型构建,分析了中国《存款保险条例》实行的内在经济原理。通过银行、政府和存款者的博弈均衡,我们发现在保证金融体系稳定的前提下,存款保险制度的实施可以让银行收益最大化,并可以通过对保险存款比例的控制调整银行承担风险的水平,同时《存款保险条例》的实施还强化了市场约束的效果,有助于银行风险承担机制的建立。
This paper analyzes the internal economic principles of the implementation of the Chinese Deposit Insurance Ordinance through the model construction of the bank’s optimal risk selection in the case of unlimited and complete implicit insurance and partial deposit insurance. Through the game equilibrium among banks, governments and depositors, we find that under the precondition of ensuring the stability of the financial system, the implementation of deposit insurance system can maximize the bank’s earnings and adjust the level of risk borne by banks by controlling the proportion of insurance deposits, At the same time, the implementation of the “Deposit Insurance Regulations” also strengthened the effect of market discipline and helped to establish a bank risk-taking mechanism.