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本文构建一个模型来考察为什么垄断、进入壁垒和贸易保护在许多国家长期存在。政治精英对中间产品索取高价的偏好导致了支持垄断和贸易保护的无效经济制度和政治制度。价格操纵机制表明,政治精英偏好于通过提高中间产品价格来增加垄断利润。提高税率虽然会增加政治精英的税收收入,但会降低对中间产品的需求,从而减少垄断利润。因此,价格操纵情况下的最优税率低于收入摄取情况下的最优税率,这与Acemoglu(2006)的结论相反。
This article builds a model to examine why monopolies, barriers to entry and trade protection have long existed in many countries. The preference of the political elite to claim higher prices for intermediate products has led to ineffective economic and political systems that support monopoly and trade protection. Price-fixing mechanisms show that political elites prefer to increase monopoly profits by raising the prices of intermediate products. Raising the tax rate will increase the tax revenue of political elites, but will reduce the demand for intermediate products and thus reduce monopoly profits. Therefore, the optimal tax rate under price manipulation is lower than the optimal tax rate under income intake, in contrast to the conclusion of Acemoglu (2006).