论文部分内容阅读
为了分析非对称的成本扰动信息对于供应链契约设计的影响,研究了当制造商的成本发生扰动并且扰动信息是非对称的情形下的零售商的最优契约设计问题。假定市场需求是关于价格的非线性函数,使用委托-代理理论,设计了非对称的成本扰动信息下的供应链最优契约菜单,并且分析了非对称的扰动信息对于供应链绩效的影响。研究结果表明,当需求为常数柔性函数或者指数函数形式时,可以设计有效的契约菜单来改善供应链的绩效;在非对称的成本扰动信息下,当生产成本扰动满足一定条件时,初始的生产计划仍然是最优的;非对称的成本扰动信息并不必然会给供应链带来利润损失。最后通过数值算例对模型的结果进行了验证。
In order to analyze the effect of asymmetric cost-perturbation information on supply chain contract design, retailers’ optimal contract design problem is studied when the manufacturer’s cost perturbed and the disturbance information is asymmetric. Assuming that market demand is a non-linear function of price, this paper designs a supply chain optimal contract menu under asymmetric cost perturbation information using principal-agent theory and analyzes the influence of asymmetric disturbance information on supply chain performance. The results show that when the demand is a constant function of flexibility or exponential function, an effective contract menu can be designed to improve the performance of the supply chain. Under asymmetric cost disturbance information, when the production cost disturbance satisfies certain conditions, the initial production The plan is still optimal; asymmetric cost disruption information does not necessarily result in loss of profit to the supply chain. Finally, numerical examples are used to verify the results of the model.