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由于经营者努力程度无法直接观察,需要寻找可观测到的变量进行近似替代。根据契约理论和激励理论,可采用经营者报酬来衡量其努力程度。本文对经营者报酬业绩敏感度的研究采用逆向思维方式,研究了经营者报酬变化对企业经营业绩变化的影响程度,以经济学中“弹性”为依据命名了测算法,指出了经营者报酬变化的最优适度区间,以期为企业提高经营业绩提供参考。
As the operator can not directly observe the effort, need to find the observed variables for the approximate replacement. According to contract theory and incentive theory, the remuneration of managers can be used to measure their efforts. In this paper, the research on the sensitivity of the operator’s remuneration performance adopts the reverse way of thinking to study the degree of influence of the remuneration change of the managers on the change of the business performance of the enterprise. The calculation method is named based on the “elasticity” in economics and points out that the operator The optimal modest range of changes in pay, with a view to improve business performance for the enterprise to provide a reference.