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近年来,我国工伤事故频发、职业安全形势严峻,工伤保险事故预防没有发挥其应有的作用。本文在借鉴已有研究的基础上,对我国工伤保险事故预防机制的制度设计及现状进行博弈分析。并基于激励相容约束理论,分析当前我国工伤保险事故预防机制的激励约束条件,得出我国工伤保险事故预防机制没有发挥有效作用的主要原因在于激励机制不合理,最后在已有法律框架内提出相应的政策建议。
In recent years, frequent accidents involving work-related injuries in our country and severe occupational safety situation have not played their due role in the prevention of industrial injury insurance accidents. Based on the existing research, this paper analyzes the system design and current situation of the prevention mechanism of industrial injury insurance in our country. And based on the theory of incentive compatible constraint, this paper analyzes the current incentive constraints of industrial accident prevention system in our country, and concludes that the main cause of the failure of industrial accident prevention mechanism in our country is that the incentive mechanism is unreasonable and finally proposed in the existing legal framework The corresponding policy recommendations.