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从2009年6月至2012年底,新股发行制度经历了三个阶段的改革。但是,新股发行衍生出的巨大利益始终是各方博弈的对象。本文的研究结论显示,“三高”现象与IPO抑价现象在我国资本市场长期存在。我国的新股发行询价制度具有中国特色,在一级市场询价过程中,发行人、承销商、询价对象等其他中介机构均在不同程度上推高了发行价格。实证分析表明,因为承销商与询价对象合谋的存在,单方面增加询价对象数量的方法不能解决发行定价过高的问题。同时,在制度设计上,网下配售比例过少也不利于买方议价能力的提高。
From June 2009 to the end of 2012, the IPO system underwent three stages of reform. However, the huge profits derived from IPO have always been the object of all parties’ game. The conclusion of this paper shows that the phenomenon of “three highs” and IPO underpricing exist in our country’s capital market for a long time. China’s IPO issuance inquiry system has Chinese characteristics in the primary market inquiry process, the issuer, underwriters, inquiry object and other intermediaries are to varying degrees pushed up the issue price. The empirical analysis shows that because of the collusion between the underwriter and the inquiry object, the unilateral increase in the number of inquiry objects can not solve the issue of over-pricing. At the same time, in the system design, too few offline placement ratio is not conducive to the buyer bargaining power.