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在市场经济发达国家企业融资方式向债务融资侧重的背景下，我国上市公司融资却存在重股轻债的现象，本文从配股参与者的角度分析了这一现象存在的根本原因。指出由于缺乏对大股东代理人的监督与大小股东之间存在信息不对称以及由此产生的流动性溢价的再分配是问题产生的关键所在。最终结果是大股东的代理人凭借所掌握的对上市公司的实际控制权作出了自己利益最大化的选择
Under the background that the corporate financing mode in the market economy countries focuses on the debt financing, the financing of listed companies in our country has the phenomenon of heavy debt and light debt. This article analyzes the root causes of this phenomenon from the perspective of the participants of the rights issue. It points out that the key to the problem lies in the lack of information asymmetry between shareholders and large and small shareholders, as well as the resulting liquidity premium redistribution. The end result is the agent of the major shareholder with the actual control over the listed company has made its own interests to maximize the choice