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针对电信业务代理渠道中,传统的基于业务分成佣金和基于奖励佣金的两种激励合同所存在的激励不足、代理商对于提高服务水平的积极性不高等问题,提出了一种基于服务成本共担契约的电信业务代理商激励机制。应用动态博弈论理论,分别建立了基于业务分成和奖励佣金的传统激励模型及基于服务成本共担契约的激励模型,通过模型求解和比较分析得出以下结论:服务成本共担契约模型的契约参数在给定取值范围内时的系统利润和服务水平相比传统激励模型存在较显著提高。本文最后通过算例分析,验证了所设计的服务成本共担契约模型对电信业务代理商激励的有效性。
In the channel of telecom service, the traditional incentives based on business commissions and incentive commissions are inadequate, and agents are not enthusiastic about improving service levels. A contract based on service cost sharing Telecom Business Agency Incentives. Based on the dynamic game theory, the traditional incentive model based on business share and reward commission and the incentive model based on service cost contract are respectively established. The following conclusions are obtained through the model solution and comparative analysis: The contractual parameters of the service cost sharing contract model Compared with the traditional incentive model, there is a significant increase in the system profit and service level within a given value range. At the end of this paper, an example is given to verify the validity of the contract model designed by service cost to the motivation of telecom service agencies.