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我国银行的债权保护问题是近几年理论界和实务界都非常关注的问题,现行的制度安排对银行债权保护存在诸多不利影响,银行债权依然存在较大风险。文章认为,对大贷款人参与公司治理设计初步框架,对举债企业及其内部人控制的行为进行监督控制或激励约束,可以抑制代理成本,客观上有利于举债公司的治理机制的完善和绩效的提高,形成债权治理效应。
The protection of creditor’s rights in China’s banks is a matter of great concern to both theorists and practitioners in recent years. The existing institutional arrangement has many adverse effects on the protection of bank claims, and there is still a great risk of bank claims. The article holds that it is objectively beneficial to the improvement and performance of the governance mechanism of debt-lenders for large lenders to participate in the initial framework of corporate governance design and to supervise and control or control the behaviors controlled by the borrowers and their insiders. Improve the formation of debt governance effect.