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标尺竞争理论研究的问题是:一个委托人如何设立最优的激励机制,使多个代理人之间产生良性竞争,以利于委托人的目标最大化。这一理论不仅适用于政府管制和购买的研究,也适用于政治科学与公共管理领域中有关政府及其官员竞争的研究,后者被称为“政治标尺竞争理论”。政治标尺竞争拓展了基于投票实施公共问责的传统理论,基于相对绩效而非绝对绩效对官员(政治代理人)进行绩效考评,极大地降低了政治委托代理关系中的信息不对称程度,优化了政治家和官员的激励机制,改善了公共管理和社会政策的绩效,有助于提升总体社会福利水平,对于公共管理和社会治理的现代化极为重要。本文详细考察了政治标尺竞争理论的产生、发展情况,着重梳理了该理论在近年来的新进展,在此基础上,对该理论的未来发展进行了展望。
The issue of scale competition theory is: how to set up an optimal incentive mechanism for a principal to generate healthy competition among multiple agents in order to maximize the client’s goals. This theory applies not only to the study of government regulation and purchase but also to the study of the competition between the government and its officials in the field of political science and public administration, which is called the “theory of competition in the political scale”. The political scale competition expands the traditional theory based on voting to implement public accountability, evaluates officials (political agents) based on relative performance rather than absolute performance, greatly reduces the degree of information asymmetry in the political agency relationship and optimizes Incentives for politicians and officials have improved the performance of public administration and social policy, helped to raise the overall level of social welfare, and was extremely important for the modernization of public administration and social governance. This article examines in detail the emergence and development of the political scale competition theory, emphasizes the new progress of the theory in recent years, and on this basis, forecasts the future development of the theory.