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公共财产语境下的腐败是官员将公共权力支配下的公共财产非法挪为私用的行为,而作为管理公共财产的法律,财税法着眼于公共财产的收入、支出和监管全过程,进而为控制公共权力提供抓手,是反腐败诸多思路中共识较大、阻力较小、可行性较高的优选路径。基于对财税法反腐内在机理的分析,本文利用中国1995~2010年省域面板数据,实证检验了财税法制建设在中国的反腐败成效。研究结果表明,增加财税立法数量能够显著减少腐败发生率,预算外收入增加和不规范财政分权度提高是导致腐败蔓延的重要原因;增加公务员工资对反腐败发挥了积极作用,而人力资本和政府规模对腐败没有显著影响;分组回归差异性检验进一步揭示了财税法治对腐败的抑制作用具有地区差异的特点。
Corruption in the context of public property is an act in which officials illegally move public property under the public power to private property. As a law governing public property, the fiscal tax law focuses on the whole process of income, expenditure and supervision of public property, Controlling public power provides the starting point, which is the preferred path of greater consensus, less resistance and more feasibility in many anti-corruption ideas. Based on the analysis of the internal mechanism of fiscal and taxation anti-corruption, this paper empirically tests the anti-corruption effectiveness of fiscal and taxation legal system construction in China from 1995 to 2010 in China. The results show that increasing the number of fiscal and taxation legislation can significantly reduce the incidence of corruption, extra-budgetary income increases and non-standardization of fiscal decentralization is leading to the spread of corruption; increased civil servants pay to anti-corruption has played an active role, and human capital and The scale of government has no significant effect on corruption; the regression of group regression test further reveals that the rule of law of finance and tax has the characteristic of regional differences in the inhibition of corruption.