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利用2002—2010年分析师盈利预测的大样本数据,本文检验了分析师报告收入预测(在报告盈利预测的同时额外报告收入预测数据)的动机和经济后果。经验结果显示,高内在能力、有私有信息和隶属于大券商的分析师,更可能报告收入预测。子样本中,小券商中高能力的分析师,以及明星分析师中高能力或具有私有信息的分析师更可能报告收入预测。上述结果支持了信号传递假说和声誉假说。最后,我们发现,报告收入预测的分析师预测,其盈利预测的准确性更高,并且市场对其盈利修改的反应更大。
Using large sample data from analysts’ earnings forecasts for 2002-2010, this article examines the analyst’s motivation and economic consequences of reporting revenue forecasts (additional reporting revenue forecasts while reporting earnings forecasts). Empirical results show that analysts with high intrinsic capacity, private information and affiliates are more likely to report revenue forecasts. Among the subsamples, analysts with medium and high capacity in brokerages and analysts with high capacity or with proprietary information in celebrity analysts are more likely to report revenue forecasts. The above results support the signaling hypothesis and reputation hypothesis. Finally, we find that analysts reporting revenue forecasts predict their earnings forecasts are more accurate and the market is more responsive to changes in their earnings.