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价格跟随行为并不必然损害市场竞争。只有在特定市场结构中,与诸如惩罚背叛、便利信息交换等其他行为相互配合,价格跟随行为才可能损害市场竞争。反垄断法对价格跟随行为的规制,从本身违法的认定,转变为便利行为理论基础上的合理分析。在查处价格跟随行为时,反垄断执法机构获取直接证据的难度较大,可通过间接证据推定价格跟随行为的违法性,但也存在较大争议。宽大政策的引入,有助于有效防止价格跟随行为对市场竞争造成损害。
Price follow behavior does not necessarily undermine market competition. Only in a particular market structure can price-following behavior compromise market competition in conjunction with other acts such as punitive defections and facilitation of exchange of information. The regulation of antitrust law on price follow-ups changed from the identification of its own illegality to the reasonable analysis based on the theory of convenience behavior. In investigating the price follow-up behavior, it is more difficult for the antitrust law enforcement agencies to obtain the direct evidence, and indirect evidence can be used to estimate the illegality of the price follow-up behavior. However, there is still much controversy. The introduction of generous policies helps to effectively prevent the price-following behavior from damaging the market competition.