论文部分内容阅读
本文试图从组织经济学角度解释日本企业的治理结构。日本企业在资本要素方面以相互持股和主银行制为特征;在劳动要素方面实行终生雇佣制、年功序列制和企业别工会;在企业间关系方面有企业集团和企业序列。在互为委托人的同时又互为代理人的情况下,相互持股和主银行制更成功地解除了委托代理的困境;从交易成本和资产专用性角度看,劳资双方的长期契约有利于大大减少交易成本,有利于对人力要素的深度开发;横向的企业集团“互换人质”使得企业内部监督有力,纵向的企业系列使得大企业把中小企业纳入分工体系,提高了资产专用性,节约了交易成本。
This article attempts to explain the governance structure of Japanese enterprises from the perspective of organizational economics. Japanese enterprises are characterized by mutual stockholding and the main banking system in terms of capital elements; life-long employment system, annual power system and business union in terms of labor factors; and enterprise groups and business sequences in the relations among enterprises. Under the condition of mutual clients as their counterparts, the mutual shareholding and the main banking system have successfully relieved the dilemma of principal-agent; from the perspective of transaction costs and asset specificity, the long-term contracts between employers and employees are favorable Greatly reducing transaction costs and facilitating the in-depth development of human resources. The horizontal exchange of hostages by enterprise groups has made the internal supervision of enterprises powerful. The vertical enterprise series have led large enterprises to include SMEs in the division of labor system, which has enhanced the asset specificity and saving Transaction costs.