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一、企业融资的代理成本理论与实证研究的回顾1.企业融资的代理成本理论企业融资的代理成本说是从委托-代理理论、企业理论和财产所有权理论,来系统分析和解释信息不对称下的资本结构问题,与其他的资本结构理论有显著的不同。代理成本说的创始人米切尔·詹森和威廉·麦克林认为:当把企业的本质定义为契约关系的结合体时,所有者与管理者之间就形成委托代理关系,在信息不对称、契约不完全下,双方的利益冲突会诱使拥有管理权的经理人员采取损害所有者利益的行为,这样就产生代理成本。代理成本通常表现为:(1)委托人的监督和激励支出:为促使代理人为委托人的利益
First, the corporate finance agency costs a review of theoretical and empirical research 1. Agency financing cost of agency theory Corporate finance agency costs from the commission - agent theory, business theory and property ownership theory to systematically analyze and explain the information asymmetry The problem of capital structure is obviously different from other theories of capital structure. The founder of cost of agency, Mitchell Jensen and William Macklin argued that when defining the essence of an enterprise as a combination of contractual relations, the principal and agent form a principal-agent relationship. Asymmetric information , The contract is not completely under the conflict of interest between both parties will induce management managers to take the act of undermining the interests of owners, thus generating agency costs. Agency costs are usually manifested as: (1) the client's supervision and incentive expenses: to promote the agent as the principal interests