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本文对美国次贷危机和债务危机进行相同的政策因素解读。美联储宽松货币政策与泰勒规则的比较发现,不恰当的货币政策扭曲了市场基准利率,释放出错误的资源配置信号。危机前的低利率政策助长了房地产信贷的过度膨胀,成为次贷危机的政策因素;而后危机时代,量化宽松货币政策再次扭曲了市场的基准利率,没有达到银行信贷和经济增长的目的,而是将美国政府拖入了债务泥潭。
This article explains the same policy factors for the subprime mortgage crisis and the debt crisis in the United States. A comparison between the Fed’s loose monetary policy and Taylor’s rule found that inappropriate monetary policy distorts the market benchmark interest rate and releases the wrong signal of resource allocation. The pre-crisis low-interest rate policy has encouraged the over-expansion of real estate credit and became the policy factor of the subprime mortgage crisis. In the post-crisis era, the quantitative easing monetary policy once again distorted the benchmark interest rate of the market and did not achieve the goal of bank credit and economic growth. Dragged the U.S. government into debt mire.