论文部分内容阅读
以2003~2010年的A股上市公司为样本,从盈余管理的视角考察了分析师独立性对公司治理效应的影响。研究发现:分析师跟踪与盈余管理水平显著负相关;与投行分析师相比,独立分析师抑制盈余管理的作用更明显;在区分盈余管理方向后,分析师跟踪及其独立性对盈余管理的抑制作用在正向盈余管理样本中更为显著。这些研究结论对于加强证券分析师队伍建设,强化其市场信息中介职能,提高上市公司的治理水平,具有一定的理论价值和现实启示。
Taking the A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2010 as samples, this paper examines the influence of analyst independence on corporate governance from the perspective of earnings management. The study found that: analyst tracking and earnings management significantly negatively correlated; Independent Analysts compared with investment bank analysts inhibit the role of earnings management is more obvious; in the direction of earnings management, analyst tracking and independence of earnings management Inhibition is even more pronounced in the positive Earnings Management sample. These conclusions have certain theoretical value and practical enlightenment for strengthening the ranks of securities analysts, strengthening their market information intermediary functions and improving the governance of listed companies.