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随着我国证券市场的发展,上市公司相互持有股权的现象非常普遍,大多数是以获取短期收益为目的的证券投资。上市公司对证券市场的广泛参与使其自身会计盈余受到证券市场行情影响,自身业绩也随之起伏不定。许多上市公司管理层出于对管理工作回报的动机、避税动机、债务契约动机等等,在各种利益的驱动下,一定会采取相应的盈余管理行为,提高企业效益。本文在分析我国上市公司盈余管理动因的基础上,提出防范和治理我国上市公司的盈余管理行为的办法。
With the development of China’s securities market, it is very common for listed companies to hold equity in each other. Most of them are securities investments for the purpose of obtaining short-term gains. The extensive participation of listed companies in the securities market makes their own accounting earnings affected by the stock market, and their performance also fluctuates. Many listed companies, out of motivation for return on management, tax avoidance motive, debt contract motivation and so on, driven by various interests, will certainly take appropriate earnings management practices to improve the efficiency of enterprises. On the basis of analyzing the motivation of the earnings management of listed companies in our country, this paper puts forward some measures to prevent and control the earnings management behavior of the listed companies in our country.