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作为农业产业化的贷款模式,互联性贷款能够借助于自我履约机制而有效缓解农户道德风险,并因此在实践中得以广泛发展。一个待解之谜是:其自我履约的微观机理是什么?本文数理模型和实证分析表明:通过增加声誉资本损失和减少当期收益,专用性资产可以双管齐下强化声誉效应、促进农村互联性贷款自我履约。基于交易特性和农户禀赋异质性,不同专用性资产在促进自我履约的作用强度方面,存在着差异性:按照指定性、交易性和物质性专用资产的顺序,它们在强化声誉效应、促进互联性贷款自我履约方面的功能是依次下降的。此外,按照大宗农产品、经济作物、畜禽品的顺序,随着专用性的提高,产品专用性资产强化声誉效应、促进自我履约的效果则渐次提高。
As a loan model for agricultural industrialization, interconnected loans can effectively alleviate the moral hazard of farmers by means of self-compliance mechanism and thus have been widely developed in practice. A puzzle to be solved is: What is the micro-mechanism of self-compliance? The mathematical model and the empirical analysis show that by increasing the loss of reputation capital and reducing the current income, the special assets can enhance the reputation effect by two-pronged approach and promote the self-compliance of rural interconnected loans . Based on the characteristics of transaction and the heterogeneity of farmer’s endowment, there are differences in the intensity of the different specialized assets in promoting the performance of self-compliance: according to the order of designated, tradable and material assets, they strengthen the reputation effect and promote the interconnection The function of self-performance of sexual loans is in turn declined. In addition, according to the order of bulk agricultural products, cash crops and livestock products, as the specificity increases, the product-specific assets strengthen the reputation effect and the effect of promoting self-compliance gradually increases.