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激励处于法定劳动年龄段且具备劳动能力的社会救助受助者就业一直是社会救助政策的重要目标,然而我国最低生活保障制度的就业激励效果并不理想。最低生活保障制度待遇补差计发方式所导致的低保待遇的100%有效边际税率,极大地扭曲了低保对象的就业行为选择。国际经验表明,强制性工作要求和基于负所得税理念的经济激励在福利国家被广泛用于就业激励。通过借鉴负所得税理念对北京市城市最低生活保障制度就业激励机制的反思和优化,北京市低保待遇的100%有效边际税率可以成功被降低。低保制度的“贫困陷阱”问题能得到克服。
Employment of social assistance recipients who are able to work in the legal working age and have the ability to work has always been an important goal of the social assistance policy. However, the employment incentive effect of the minimum living security system in our country is not satisfactory. The minimum living allowance system 100% of the subsistence allowances, the effective marginal tax rate, which greatly distorts the choice of employment behavior. International experience shows that mandatory job requirements and economic incentives based on the concept of negative income tax are widely used in employment incentives in welfare states. By rethinking and optimizing the employment incentive mechanism of urban minimum living security system in Beijing, the 100% effective marginal tax rate of minimal assurance in Beijing can be successfully reduced. The “poverty trap” issue of the dibao system can be overcome.