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本研究将渠道行为理论中的权力及其运用与渠道关系管理结合,通过问卷法调研得来广东玩具行业的数据,进行实证研究。研究结果表明:第一,当制造商具有越大权力,经销商对他的依赖性越强,他越有可能使用非强制性影响策略来影响经销商;第二,制造商使用非强制影响策略会增进渠道成员彼此间的关系质量;第三,渠道成员间彼此的渠道关系质量是支持时,会增强彼此团结合作的程度。此外,研究还发现,在不成熟的行业中,制造商使用非强制影响策略,并不会直接增加彼此之间的团结程度,团结程度的增加是由关系质量的正向影响产生的。
In this study, we combine the power and its application in channel behavior theory with channel relationship management, and conduct empirical research on the data of Guangdong toy industry through questionnaire survey. The results show that the first is that the more the manufacturer has more authority and the more reliance the dealer has on him, the more likely he is to use the non-mandatory influence strategy to influence the dealer. Second, the manufacturer uses the non-mandatory influence strategy Will improve the quality of the relationship between channel members; thirdly, when the quality of the channel relationship between channel members is supportive, it will enhance the level of solidarity and cooperation with each other. In addition, the study also found that in immature industries, the use of non-force-influencing strategies by manufacturers did not directly increase the degree of solidarity among themselves. The increase in solidarity was generated by the positive influence of the quality of the relationship.