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本文论述了(1)制度为什么变迁以及怎样变迁;(2)在一个变迁的环境中一种制度怎样维系下去;(3)某种制度不断放松限制直至其消亡的过程又是怎样的。本文强调了博弈论中对应于自我实施均衡的概念,并表明了关注这一过程的历史制度主义对这些问题的回答都是不充分的。本文建立在博弈论的基础上,并且考虑到历史制度主义者对这一理论基础的批评,介绍了诸如拟参数(Quasi-parameters)和自我强化(Self-reinforce-ment)的概念,在重复博弈的理论基础上,利用这些概念,笔者提出了制度分析的动态方法。它可以解释制度的内生变迁(或稳定)。通过分析现代欧洲早期的正式规制制度和当代世界裂散结构(Cleavage Structure)的非正式制度,本文提供了对这一分析方法的理解。
This paper discusses (1) why institutional change and how it changes; (2) how does a system survive in a changing environment; and (3) how does a system continue to relax until its demise? This paper emphasizes the concept of game theory that corresponds to the self-implementing equilibrium and shows that the historical institutionalism that focuses on this process is not sufficient to answer these questions. This article is based on game theory and takes into account the criticisms of historical institutionalists on this theoretical basis, introducing concepts such as Quasi-parameters and Self-reinforce-ment, Based on the theory, the use of these concepts, the author proposed a dynamic method of institutional analysis. It can explain the endogenous change (or stability) of institutions. This article provides an understanding of this analytical approach by analyzing the informal institutions of the formal regulatory system of the early modern Europe and the Cleavage Structure of the contemporary world.